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Abstract
Schizotypy refers to the continuum of normal variability of psychosis-like characteristics and experiences, often classified as
positive schizotypy (‘unusual experiences’; UE) and negative schizotypy (‘introvertive anhedonia’; IA). Here, we investigated
the link between schizotypy and cognitive processing style and performance. A particular focus was on whether schizotypy is
associated more with Type 1 (automatic/heuristic) than Type 2 (reflective/effortful) processes, as may be expected from findings
of impaired top-down control in schizophrenia. A large sample (n = 1,512) completed online measures pertaining to schizotypy
(Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE), thinking style (Rational Experiential Inventory-10,
Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale), and reasoning performance (Cognitive Reflection Test). Higher positive (UE) and
negative (IA) schizotypy were associated with more pronounced Type 1 processing, i.e. greater self-reported Faith in Intuition
(FI), lower Need for Cognition (NFC), lower Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT), and lower cognitive reflection test
(CRT) scores. Canonical correlation analysis confirmed a significant association between UE and increased FI, lower AOT
and lower CRT performance, accounting for 12.38% of the shared variance between schizotypy and thinking dispositions. IA
was more highly associated with reduced NFC. These findings suggest that schizotypy may be associated with similar thinking
dispositions to those reported in psychosis, with different patterns of associations for positive and negative schizotypy. This
result informs research on reasoning processes in psychosis and has clinical implications, including potential treatment targets
and refinements for cognitive therapies.
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1 Introduction
Schizotypy refers to a continuum of psychosis-like charac-
teristics and experiences, ranging in intensity from low to
states that might be observed in clinical psychosis (Ettinger,
Meyhöfer, Steffens, Wagner & Koutsouleris, 2014). Schizo-
typy is thought to encompass a range of human experiences
and traits including unusual beliefs and perceptions, magical
thinking, anhedonia and introversion (Fisher et al., 2004),
and has been linked to creativity and artistic pursuits (Acar,
Chen & Cayirdag, 2018; Burch, Pavelis, Hemsley & Corr,
2006; O’Reilly, Dunbar & Bentall, 2001), but has also been
found to be associated with deficits in cognitive task perfor-
mance (Cohen, Mohr, Ettinger, Chan & Park, 2015).
Positive and negative schizotypy are considered to be
the two most reliable dimensions of schizotypy (Kwapil,
Barrantes-Vidal & Silvia, 2008), although other factors such
as cognitive disorganisation and impulsive non-conformity
have also been proposed (Mason, 2006). Positive schizotypy
refers to unusual experiences, perceptions, beliefs and magi-
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cal thinking, while negative schizotypy refers to experiences
such as anhedonia (attenuated ability to experience pleasure)
and introversion (Fisher et al., 2004). Schizotypy arguably
captures the range, heterogeneity and multi-dimensionality
(Barrantes-Vidal, Grant & Kwapil, 2015) of psychosis and
psychosis-like experiences. Furthermore, investigation of
schizotypy as a trait may circumvent the confounding ef-
fects of medication, which can have global sedative effects
that can greatly impede validity when exploring cognition
(Barnes & McPhillips, 1999; Lambert et al., 2004).
Dual-process theories of thinking and decision-making
have become ubiquitous and influential within cognitive psy-
chology, and are supported by considerable empirical evi-
dence (Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983; Klauer, Musch &
Naumer, 2000). Within these frameworks, ‘Type 1’ process-
ing is thought to be fast, intuitive and automatic, relying on
heuristics (i.e. mental shortcuts) or ‘gut feelings’, and out
of conscious cognitive control, while ‘Type 2’ processing
is considered to be slow, reflective, effortful, and generally
more rational (Bryan & Harter, 1899; Evans, 2003, 2008,
2010; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
Importantly, dual process theories have been integrated
into psychosis-related frameworks, particularly in relation to
positive symptoms such as delusional beliefs and persecutory
ideation. In general, the proposition is that a combination of
over-reliance on Type 1 reasoning alongside a lower propen-
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sity to use Type 2 reflective reasoning is associated with
the maintenance of unusual or distressing beliefs (Freeman,
Evans&Lister, 2012; Ward&Garety, in press; Ward, Peters,
Jackson, Day & Garety, 2018). For example, in people with
delusional ideation, Freeman and colleagues (2012) identi-
fied a positive association between paranoid thoughts and
intuitive thinking, while higher levels of deliberative think-
ing were associated with fewer paranoid thoughts. People
with delusional beliefs have also been found to exhibit a
cognitive disposition towards lower belief flexibility than
people without delusions (Colbert, Peters & Garety, 2010),
which may indicate a less flexible and open-minded rea-
soning style. Indeed, both delusion-proneness (Bronstein,
Pennycook, Bear, Rand & Cannon, in press) and reduced
data gathering (Ross et al., 2016) have been associated with
a less analytical thinking style. Furthermore, intuitive (Type
1) thinking has also been associated with parapsychologi-
cal/anomalous experiences (Irwin & Wilson, 2013) as well
as paranormal explanations for anomalous experiences (Ir-
win & Wilson, 2013; Ross, Hartig & McKay, 2017).
Studies also suggest that people with psychosis demon-
strate a greater propensity for a ‘jumping to conclusions’
(JTC) bias than non-clinical subjects (Garety, Kuipers,
Fowler, Freeman & Bebbington, 2001; So, Siu, Wong, Chan
& Garety, 2016). This bias refers to the tendency to make
hastier decisions and/or decisions with greater conviction
(Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988). Two independent meta-
analyses have identified a more prominent JTC bias in peo-
ple with psychosis than control participants (Dudley, Taylor
& Wickham, 2015; McLean, Mattiske & Balzan, 2017) as
well as an increased JTC bias in people with delusions vs.
those without delusions in psychosis (Dudley et al., 2015;
McLean et al., 2017). Another meta-analysis (Ross, McKay,
Coltheart & Langdon, 2015) found an association between
delusions and the JTC bias in delusion-prone samples. In-
vestigating the mechanisms involved in JTC, Glöckner and
Moritz (2009) found that more extreme confidence ratings
were endorsed by people with schizophrenia than healthy
controls when making decisions, while there was no dif-
ference in the amount of information gathered across the
groups. However, the clinical group resorted to a less nor-
matively effective strategy under stress; weighing all infor-
mation equally regardless of its validity.
A further observation in the literature that is linked to the
concept of thinking styles in people with psychosis (Eise-
nacher & Zink, 2017) is the cognitive bias against discon-
firmatory evidence (BADE), reported particularly in people
scoring highly in delusion-proneness (McLean et al., 2017;
Woodward, Buchy, Moritz &Liotti, 2007). BADE refers to a
tendency to be less likely to integrate new evidence that dis-
confirms one’s existing beliefs. A recent meta-analysis iden-
tified greater BADE in people with psychosis than healthy
controls as well as in people with delusions in psychosis than
people without delusions in psychosis (McLean et al., 2017).
In contrast to the substantial literature in psychosis, the
evidence base for reasoning processes in schizotypy is less
well-established. Positive schizotypy, i.e. unusual beliefs,
has been linked to intuitive thinking (Boden, Berenbaum &
Topper, 2012) (assessed by the Rational Experiential Inven-
tory; REI, Pacini & Epstein, 1999; see also Genovese, 2005).
In terms of deliberative thinking, there is some evidence that
Type 2 logical reasoning ability is reduced in schizotypy, but
findings vary across tasks related to logical reasoning and
across studies. For example, Dagnall, Denovan, Drinkwater,
Parker & Clough (2016) found that higher positive schizo-
typy (unusual experiences) was associated with poorer per-
formance on reasoning problems involving statistical bias.
Tsakanikos (2004) found that all dimensions out of the four
schizotypy dimensions tested (unusual experiences, intro-
vertive anhedonia, cognitive disorganisation and impulsive
non-conformity) were associatedwith impaired performance
on logical reasoning problems. Interestingly, Karimi, Wind-
mann, Güntürkün & Abraham (2007) reported enhanced
reasoning in people with higher schizotypy scores for cre-
ative or lateral problem solving (as opposed to goal focused
problem solving), although another study reported no such
association (Webb, Little, Cropper & Roze, 2017).
Several studies have reported a significant JTC bias in high
compared with low schizotypy (Brugger & Graves, 1997;
Moritz et al., 2017; Moritz, Van Quaquebeke & Lincoln,
2012; Sellen, Oaksford & Gray, 2005), although some stud-
ies have found no evidence for a JTC bias in positive and
negative schizotypy (Juárez-Ramos et al., 2014; Sellen et
al., 2005). Research into the association between BADE
and schizotypy have similarly yielded inconclusive results
(Buchy, Woodward & Liotti, 2007; Orenes, Navarrete, Bel-
trán & Santamaría, 2012). This may reflect the need to use
more sensitive measures in schizotypy compared with psy-
chosis or clinical samples, in which the effect sizes are likely
to be larger and more detectable.
In summary, previous research seems to point to an associ-
ation between schizotypy and reasoning processes (thinking
dispositions as well as performance), but the exact nature
of this interplay has not been comprehensively investigated.
Thus far these processes have been considered only in iso-
lation, e.g., the association between schizotypy and thinking
dispositions, or between thinking dispositions and thinking
performance. Here, we sought to more comprehensively
investigate the relationship between individual differences
in schizotypy and reasoning processes in the context of dual
process models. In addition to self-reported intuitive and de-
liberative thinking, we also considered actively open-minded
thinking beliefs and a performance-based measure of cog-
nitive reflection. The cognitive reflection test (Frederick,
2005) was used as it exhibits properties related to the JTC
tasks mentioned above (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). We hy-
pothesised that people with higher schizotypy scores would
demonstrate greater experiential/intuitive reasoning (Faith
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in Intuition; FI), lower propensity for deliberative/effortful
reasoning (Need for Cognition; NFC), reduced open-minded
thinking beliefs (AOT), and reduced reflective thinking per-
formance (CRT).
2 Method
The study employed a cross-sectional quantitative design.
Participants completed an online survey created through the
Qualtrics (2018) survey platform. Participation took approx-
imately 10–15 minutes and upon completion participants re-
ceived brief, general and non-pathologising feedback sum-
maries based on their scores for positive and negative schizo-
typy.
2.1 Participants
The study was advertised and distributed through per-
sonal social media, university contacts, small ads websites
(Gumtree), psychology research websites, and local com-
munity settings (e.g. Cafés, Yoga studios). Purposive re-
cruitment was also undertaken by advertising the study in
Facebook groups dedicated to topics such as spirituality,
esoteric knowledge, paranormal beliefs, gaming and intro-
version. Participants were required to be 17 years of age or
older to participate.
2.2 Materials
2.2.1 Demographics
Participants recorded their age, gender and highest com-
pleted level of education.
2.2.2 Schizotypy
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experi-
ences (O-LIFE) short form schizotypy scale (Mason et al.,
2005) was used to measure positive and negative schizotypy.
The O-LIFE short form is briefer and easier to administer
than the original, whilst retaining favourable psychometric
properties (Mason et al., 2005). Twelve self-report items
assess Unusual Experiences (UE) and ten items assess Intro-
vertive Anhedonia (IA). There are two other subscales, Cog-
nitive Disorganisation (CD) and Impulsive Non-Conformity
(IN), which were not relevant for the present study and were
therefore not administered. Items are rated as 1 for a ‘yes’ re-
sponse and 0 for a ‘no’ (except reverse-coded items), and are
summed to provide a score for each dimension of schizotypy.
Sample Items:
When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even
though there is nothing there? (UE)
Do you feel very close to your friends? (IA) (reverse-
coded)
2.2.3 Cognitive Reflection (CRT)
The combined Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick,
2005) was used to measure cognitive reflection or ‘miserly
processing’. The CRT is a performance-based measure con-
sisting of brief math-like puzzles that assess the ability to
withhold a tempting intuitive (but incorrect) Type 1 response
and engage in reflective Type 2 processing to generate a cor-
rect response. It is negatively correlated with a variety of
cognitive biases (Frederick, 2005).
All items proposed from across three papers (Frederick,
2005; Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2014; Thomson & Oppen-
heimer, 2016) were included, except for the ‘bat and ball’
problem, due to its now high level of familiarity in the public
domain. A ‘control’ item consisting of a simple mathemati-
cal problem (with no ‘lure’ response)was embedded amongst
the items, but did not contribute to CRT performance score.
Correct responses were awarded a score of 1, while incorrect
responses were awarded 0, with a maximum total score of
10. Higher total scores were indicative of greater ability to
think analytically and override heuristic processing.
Sample Item (from CRT-2; Thomson & Oppenheimer,
2016):
A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are
left? [Intuitive answer: 7, Correct answer: 8]
An additional question “have you seen any of the above
puzzles before?” was included and participants were asked
to specify which puzzles they were familiar with. Accuracy
scores were calculated based on the proportion of correct
responses only for previously unseen items for each respon-
dent.
2.2.4 Thinking Beliefs (AOT)
A shorter 7-item version (Haran, Ritov & Mellers, 2013) of
the original Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale (AOTS;
Stanovich & West, 1997) was used to measure beliefs about
good thinking, particularly the tendency to engage in open-
minded thinking and attend to evidence opposing favored
conclusions. The short form has good face validity and
reliability (Haran et al., 2013). Questions are answered on
a 7-point scale and are summed to provide an overall score
ranging from 7 to 49. Higher total score favors a more
open-minded and flexible approach to thinking.
Sample Item:
People should revise their beliefs in response to new in-
formation or evidence.
2.2.5 Type 1 and Type 2 Processing
The Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-10; Epstein,
Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) comprises two unipo-
lar scales each consisting of five items; Faith in Intuition (FI)
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Table 1: Sample characteristics.
Variable Mean(SD) OR n(%)
Age (years); Mean (SD); (range) 34.19 (13.36); (17–78)
Gender, n (%)
Male 338 (22.4)
Female 1162 (76.9)
Other 6 (0.4)
Would prefer not to say 6 (0.4)
Highest Education, n (%)
School 227 (15.0)
College or Sixth Form 309 (20.4)
Vocational Qualification 146 (9.7)
Bachelor’s Degree (BSc/BA) 429 (28.4)
Postgraduate Diploma 74 (4.9)
Master’s Degree (MSc/MA) 258 (17.1)
Doctorate/PhD 61 (4.0)
Questionnaire scores, Mean(SD)
Unusual Experiences 5.06 (3.03)
Introvertive Anhedonia 3.10 (2.33)
Cognitive Reflection Test 4.04 (2.55)
Actively Open-Minded Thinking 36.21 (6.53)
Faith in Intuition 18.11 (3.73)
Need for Cognition 18.53 (3.41)
Note: Continuous variables were found to be normally
distributed as assessed by histograms and Q-Q plots.
and Need for Cognition (NFC). Based on Epstein’s Cog-
nitive Experiential Self Theory (Epstein, 2003), they are
thought to tap into Type 1 (intuitive-experiential) and Type 2
(analytic-rational) processes respectively. The original 40-
item version (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) is reported to have
good psychometric properties including high internal valid-
ity (Cronbach’s alphas > 0.85). Responses are rated on a
5-point Likert scale and total scores indicate a preponder-
ance to engage in intuitive or rational thinking processes
respectively.
Sample Items:
My initial impressions of people are almost always right.
(FI)
I would prefer complex to simple problems. (NFC)
2.3 Data Analysis
Gender was transformed from into a binary variable ‘sex’
with male coded as 0 and female coded as 1. This meant that
for the 0.7% of respondents who entered ‘Other’ or ‘Would
prefer not to say’ into the gender field, data for ‘sex’ was not
coded and was not included in the analysis.
164 incomplete survey responses were retained in the
dataset, and were included in the analysis where possible
through pairwise deletion. Otherwise, cases with one-off
item-level missing data were subject to mean imputation
(Kalton & Kasprzyk, 1986). Mean imputation was carried
out on a very small proportion of the data (0.0007% of items
on both the AOT and REI-10) falling well within the accept-
able recommended limits (Shrive, Stuart, Quan & Ghali,
2006).
3 Results
3.1 Sample Characteristics
A sample size of 1,512 participants was achieved. We sought
a large sample in order to have a sufficiently powered study
to detect potential nuances in the relationships between the
different variables. Descriptive statistics are reported in Ta-
ble 1. The majority of respondents were female (76.9%) and
participant age spanned 17–78 years. Highest level of com-
pleted education was also well spread, with decent represen-
tation from those who had not completed higher education
beyond school (15.0%), those who had completed sixth form
(20.4%), vocational qualifications (9.7%), undergraduate de-
grees (28.4%), postgraduate degrees (22.0%) and doctoral
degrees (4.0%).
3.2 Associations between Variables
Pairwise independent samples t-tests were performed be-
tween males and females, with all continuous variables of
interest as dependent variables. The results are displayed in
Table 2. Homogeneity of variance as assessed by Levene’s
test was not violated for any variables, except for CRT. There-
fore, statistics for assumed equal variances are reported gen-
erally and unassumed equal variances are reported for CRT.
CRT, IA, AOT and NFC was significantly higher in males
than females, while UE and FI were significantly higher in
females than males.
Pairwise Pearson’s correlation coefficients are displayed
in Table 3. As for significant correlations, positive schizo-
typy (UE) was positively associated with IA and FI, and
negatively associated with age, CRT, AOT and NFC. Simi-
larly, negative schizotypy (IA) was positively correlated with
FI and negatively correlated with CRT, AOT and NFC, but
was not significantly associated with age. None of the vari-
ables were found to be correlated to a degree that suggested
they were measuring the same underlying construct, with the
highest r being .39 for the association between Cognitive Re-
flection and AOT. While some of the variables undoubtedly
overlap, they appear to be conceptually distinct.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2019 Thinking dispositions and cognitive reﬂection in schizotypy 84
Table 2: T-tests for schizotypy, thinking processes and think-
ing styles by sex.
Male Female
Variable Mean SD Mean SD t p
UE 4.61 2.97 5.17 3.02 3.02 .003
IA 3.42 2.30 3.01 2.33 −2.77 .006
Age 34.47 13.94 34.15 13.17 −.40 .692
CRT 4.75 2.74 3.82 2.46 −5.19 <.001
AOT 37.56 6.64 35.81 6.43 −4.15 <.001
FI 17.65 3.83 18.24 3.69 2.45 .014
NFC 19.14 3.39 18.35 3.40 −3.56 <.001
Note: UE=unusual experiences, IA=introvertive an-
hedonia, CRT=cognitive reflection test, AOT=actively
open-minded thinking, FI=faith in intuition,
NFC=need for cognition. p-values are two-tailed. The
minimum N is 303 for males and 1031 for males.
Table 3: Correlation coefficients.
UE IA CRT AOT FI NFC Age
UE . .26 -.22 -.21 .32 -.07 -.09
IA .26 . -.11 -.11 .07 -.12 -.01
CRT -.22 -.11 . .39 -.22 .25 .02
AOT -.21 -.11 .39 . -.29 .30 .03
FI .32 .07 -.22 -.29 . -.07 .06
NFC -.07 -.12 .25 .30 -.07 . .05
Age -.09 -.01 .02 .03 .06 .05 .
Note: CRT=cognitive reflection test, UE=unusual expe-
riences, IA=introvertive anhedonia; AOT=actively open-
minded thinking, FI=faith in intuition, NFC=need for cog-
nition. All tests two-tailed. 95% confidence intervals are
all ±.05. N’s are at least 1330. r = .06 required for p<.05,
r = .07 required for p<.01, r = .10 required for p<.001.
3.3 Canonical Correlation Analysis
A canonical correlation analysis was conducted between the
two schizotypy variables (UE and IA) and the four thinking
process variables (FI, NFC, AOT and performance based
CRT) to evaluate the multivariate shared relationship be-
tween the two sets of variables.1 The analysis yielded two
1Canonical correlation looks for a linear combination of one set of
variables that maximally correlates with a linear combination of another
set, then for a second pair of linear combinations that account for what
the first set misses, and so on, but here there can only be two of these
functions because one set of variables has only two members. So the
question comes down to whether the cognitive measures can predict the
schizotypymeasures overall, and, if so, whichmeasures aremore important,
Table 4: Canonical correlation analysis between schizotypy
and thinking process variables.
Function 1 Function 2
Variable Coef r[s] Coef r[s] h2
Schizotypy
UE .977 .997 −.351 −.074 99.95
IA .076 .338 1.035 .941 99.97
Thinking processes
FI .735 .881 −.469 −.306 86.98
NFC −.015 −.223 −.799 −.878 82.06
AOT −.225 −.581 −.270 −.418 51.23
CRT −.358 −.611 −.128 −.329 48.15
Note: Structure coefficients (r[s]) greater than |.45| are dis-
played in bold. Coef = standardized canonical function
coefficient (weight of each variable); r[s] = structure coef-
ficient (loading; correlation of each variable with function
score); h2 = communality coefficient (percent of variance
in each measure accounted for by both functions); UE =
unusual experiences; IA = introvertive anhedonia; FI =
faith in intuition; NFC = need for cognition; AOT = ac-
tively open-minded thinking; CRT = cognitive reflection
test.
functions with squared canonical correlations (Rc
2) of .123
and .014 for each successful function. Overall, the full model
across both functions was statistically significant (Wilks’ λ =
.86, F (8, 2656) = 25.16, p < .001).2 Tests of dimensionality
further indicated that both of the canonical dimensions were
statistically significant at the level p < .001. Thus, the best
linear predictor of IA was not the same combination of the
four predictors as the best predictor of UE.
Dimension reduction analysis tested the hierarchical ar-
rangement of functions to establish their statistical signif-
icance. In addition to the full model (Functions 1 to 2)
reaching statistical significance as highlighted above, the re-
maining function (Function 2) also explained a statistically
significant amount of shared variance between the variable
sets, F(3,1329) = 6.19, p < .001. However, referring to Rc
2
effects, Function 1 is considered far more noteworthy as it
accounted for 12.38% of the shared variance. Function 2
needs to be interpreted with the caveat that it explained only
1.38% of the remaining variance after prior functions were
extracted.
and whether different cognitive measures are relatively more important for
one schizotypy measure than the other.
2AsWilks’λ represents howmuch variance is unexplained by themodel,
1−Wilks’ λ provides the full effect size for the model. Therefore, for the
two canonical functions, the r2 type effect size was .14. This suggests that
the full model explained approximately 14% of the variance shared between
schizotypy and thinking style.
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Standardized canonical function coefficients and structure
coefficients for both functions are displayed in Table 4, in
addition to the communalities (h2) across the two functions
for each variable.
It is clear that Function 1 concerns mostly the predictor of
UE (.977 vs. .076, upper left of Table 4) while Function 2
concerns the predictors of IA (−.351 vs. 1.035).
For Function 1, FI, AOT and CRT were the primary pre-
dictors of UE (but not NFC). UE was positively associated
with FI and negatively associated with AOT and CRT.
For Function 2, the coefficients indicate that IA and NFC,
especially NFC, are the primary variables relevant to the
prediction of (mostly) IA and are inversely associated.
In summary, UE is most significantly associated with a
combination of increased FI, lower AOT and lower CRT
performance, while IA is best predicted by reduced NFC.
4 Discussion
This study sought to investigate how individual differences in
schizotypy are related to reasoning processes in the context
of dual processmodels. The aimwas to generate amore com-
prehensive understanding of reasoning and decision-making
in schizotypy, to build on current theoretical understandings
and inform clinical interventions and practical applications
in schizophrenia spectrum populations.
Sex differences in schizotypy mirrored previous literature
(Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2018; Mason & Claridge, 2006),
with women reporting higher UE than men, and men re-
porting higher IA than women. Men were also found to
attain higher average scores on the CRT, as reported else-
where (Frederick, 2005). Both positive (UE) and negative
(IA) schizotypy dimensions were associated with higher FI,
lower NFC, lower self-reported AOT and lower cognitive re-
flection test (CRT) performance. This suggests that overall,
schizotypy was associated with greater reliance on intuitive
processing and less reliance on deliberative processing, as
well as a less open-minded and reflective reasoning style.
Further analyses of the shared relationship between the two
sets of variables, found that positive schizotypy (UE) was
positively associated with intuitive thinking (FI) and nega-
tively associatedwithAOTand thinking performance (CRT).
Negative schizotypy (IA), on the other hand, was inversely
associated with deliberative thinking (NFC), but only to a
small degree. This suggests that, in our sample, reasoning
processes co-varied to a greater extent with positive schizo-
typy than they did with negative schizotypy.
A preponderance for greater intuitive thinking and lower
deliberative thinking fits with our hypotheses related to rea-
soning processes in schizotypy. Such a profile has been
reported in delusions (Freeman et al., 2012; Ward & Garety,
in press; Ward et al., 2018) as well as in belief in conspiracy
theories (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran & Furnham, 2014).
This is particularly consistent with our observed associa-
tion between positive schizotypy (which is characterized by
unusual experiences) and more intuitive, less open-minded
thinking and a less reflective reasoning performance. While
there appears to be a lower preponderance for rational Type
2 thinking in high schizotypy scorers, this may not extend
to all types of higher-level thinking. For example, creative
thinking has previously been reported to be enhanced in
high schizotypy scorers (Karimi et al., 2007), which could
be tested in future studies with objective performance-based
measures of creative Type 2 reasoning.
A novel finding is that both UE and IA were inversely
related to cognitive reflection test (CRT) performance. The
negative association between schizotypy and AOT also sug-
gests a lower propensity to consider alternative or conflicting
evidence when reasoning (and a lower value placed on such
consideration). The association was stronger between AOT
and UE than it was for IA, suggesting a more robust associa-
tion for positive than negative schizotypy. This is consistent
with the literature, in which delusional beliefs are reported
to be associated with lower belief flexibility, JTC and BADE
in clinical samples (Ward & Garety, in press).
Similarly, UE (but not IA) was significantly associated
with cognitive reflection after subjecting the two sets of
variables to a canonical correlation analysis. The reason
for this dissociation might be that negative schizotypy has
a less cognitive quality, tapping more strongly into intro-
version or deriving less pleasure from activities: given a
lower tendency to derive pleasure from reflective thinking,
people scoring more highly in IA would reasonably be ex-
pected to gain less satisfaction from engaging in effortful
and deliberative thought. This draws parallels with the lack
of motivation (or ‘amotivation’) that is thought to be char-
acteristic of clinical psychosis (Jean-Michel, Raoul & Marc,
2014), and the relatively strong negative correlation between
IA and NFC suggests that NFC may be more sensitive than
the other cognitivemeasures tomotivation (as the NFC items
also suggest).
“Epistemic self-regulation” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013)
thus seems to play a role in cognitive reflection. Schizotypy
then seems to affect (if we can infer causation) the ability (or
desire in the case of IA) to self-regulate one’s goals: there is
less willingness to collect and consider more information or
consider other points of view (AOT), and less of a tendency
to think extensively about a situation and the future conse-
quences. In addition, there is a direct relationship of UE
(but not IA) with CRT score, which may reflect the assumed
positive or additional processes causing either an increase in
Type 1 activity (automatic responses) or an interference with
Type 2 processing (constructive, reflective thought), or both,
within positive schizotypy.
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4.1 Implications
The present study has both theoretical and practical implica-
tions. Increasing people’s capacity for cognitive reflection,
through encouraging consideration of alternative options or
further deliberative reasoning could be clinically useful. For
example, eliciting analytic thinking has been successful in
reducing beliefs in conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014).
Furthermore, as Type 2 reasoning is reportedly poorer in
clinical psychosis compared with psychosis-like experiences
in non-clinical samples (Ward et al., 2018), effective ratio-
nal reasoning may be protective in preventing paranoia or
distressing appraisals associated with psychosis-like experi-
ences.
Clinical interventions that target thinking processes have
shown promise in treating various aspects of psychosis. For
example, metacognitive training programs, which focus on
amending reasoning biases have had favorable outcomes for
people with psychosis, evidence which has been replicated
and extended to the “gold-standard” of randomized-control
trials (Aghotor, Pfueller, Moritz, Weisbrod & Roesch-Ely,
2010; Briki et al., 2018; Moritz & Woodward, 2007) and
group formats (Moritz et al., 2011; Moritz et al., 2018).
Cognitive Enhancement Therapy, a multidimensional pro-
gram consisting of neurocognitive training and social cogni-
tive group exercises, has also shown promising results (Eack
et al., 2009; Hogarty et al., 2004), as has Cognitive Reme-
diation Therapy, which aims to improve cognitive flexibil-
ity and psychosocial functioning (McGurk, Twamley, Sitzer,
McHugo &Mueser, 2007; Wykes, Huddy, Cellard, McGurk
& Czobor, 2011). While the effect sizes in our study were
relatively small, it could reasonably be hypothesized that
these effects would be more pronounced in clinical samples,
which could be investigated in future research.
Our findingsmay suggest that clinical interventions related
to negative schizotypy would be better placed to also focus
on other aspects, such as potentially increasing wellbeing
or psychosocial functioning (Greenwood, Landau &Wykes,
2005; Hunter &Barry, 2018; Lincoln, Mehl, Kesting&Rief,
2011). Interestingly, however, increased cognitive flexibil-
ity has been found to be a predictor of increased treatment
response to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Psychosis
(Garety et al., 1997; So et al., 2012), one of the recom-
mended psychological interventions for psychosis (NICE,
2014). This finding suggests that encouraging flexible think-
ing or AOT could potentially also exert beneficial effects
through enhancing therapeutic responses to evidence-based
psychological interventions.
4.2 Strengths and Limitations
Strengths of the current study include the large sample size,
which enhances the reliability and generalizability of the
findings. There was also good representation across a wide
range of ages and education levels and from across the
schizotypy continuum. The present study is novel in its
approach and adds meaningful and valuable contributions to
the literature on schizotypy and decision-making.
Nevertheless, the study needs to be couched in a number
of limitations. The psychological constructs examined are
not absolute, clear-cut and categorical phenomena. As with
any cognitive constructs, they likely tap into multiple pro-
cesses and share a degree of overlap. The multiple variations
in dual process theories in the literature reflect this hetero-
geneity (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). However, this is a caveat
that applies across the field of personality research, and the
approach we took arguably maximizes our ability to capture
and identify these nuanced and reciprocal relationships.
The use of self-report measures also assumes that people
are aware of and able to report their own reasoning ten-
dencies and beliefs. Furthermore, intelligence or cognitive
ability beyond the CRT were not explicitly assessed (Toplak,
West & Stanovich, 2011) and mental health difficulties, sub-
stance misuse and neurological problems were not specif-
ically screened for. However, it could be argued that this
makes the data more representative of ‘real’ people and the
population at large which it is intending to emulate.
4.3 Conclusions
The present study provides evidence that thinking processes
and attitudes may vary according to schizotypy levels. These
findings may highlight similar reasoning processes to those
reported in psychosis; higher positive and negative schizo-
typy appeared to be related to greater reliance on intuitive
thinking, less reliance on deliberative reasoning, a less open-
minded thinking style and poorer reasoning performance,
with more marked effects in positive than negative schizo-
typy. These findings carry clinical implications, including
potential useful treatment targets and refinements for cogni-
tive therapies.
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